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Abstract. The increasing demand for Data Mining as a Service, using
cloud storage, has raised data security concerns. Standard data encryp-
tion schemes are unsuitable because they do not support the mathemat-
ical operations that data mining requires. Homomorphic and Order Pre-
serving Encryption provide a potential solution. Existing work, directed
at data clustering, has demonstrated that using such schemes provides
for secure data mining. However, to date, all proposed approaches have
entailed some degree of data owner participation, in many cases the
amount of participation is substantial. This paper proposes an approach
to secure data clustering that does not require any data owner partici-
pation (once the data has been encrypted). The approach operates using
the idea of an Encrypted Distance Matrix (EDM) which, for illustrative
purposes, has been embedded in an approach to secure third-party data
clustering - the Secure Nearest Neighbour Clustering (SNNC) approach,
that uses order preserving and homomorphic encryption. Both the EDM
concept and the SNNC approach are fully described.
Keywords: Privacy preserving data mining, Secure nearest neighbour
clustering, Order preserving encryption, Homomorphic encryption.
1 Introduction
Data Mining as a Service (DMaaS), using cloud storage, provides data owners
with a set of useful tools for data analytics. Although cloud services provide a
reliable infrastructure to host data and the potential for third party analytics, us-
age of such services entails issues of data confidentiality and security, and unau-
thorised data accesses (data leakage). Consequently, Privacy Preserving Data
Mining (PPDM) approaches have been proposed to address these issues [1]. The
typical PPDM approach is to provide the third party data miner with a version
of the data where sensitive data attributes have been either removed or modi-
fied using data transformation methods, such as data obfuscation, perturbation
and anonymization. These methods tend to operate by introducing “statistical
noise” to the sensitive attribute-values. This can then compromise the effective-
ness of the data analysis; whilst, at the same time, it might still be possible to
2 Almutairi et al.
“reverse engineer” the original data values. Hence, data confidentiality cannot
be guaranteed.
Data encryption can substantially guarantee data privacy and significantly
mitigate against the risk of unauthorised data accesses. However, data encryp-
tion, in its standard form, prevents the application of any form of data mining,
rendering it unsuited in the context of DMaaS. Data mining activities require
data manipulation and data comparison of some form. A potential solution is
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [7], a form of encryption that supports a lim-
ited number of mathematical operations. HE schemes have been proposed that
support addition, subtraction, multiplication and division of various forms. How-
ever, although the operations provided by HE schemes go some way to support
DMaaS, they do not provide an entire solution; for example they do not support
logical operations (over cypher-text) that data mining algorithms frequently re-
quire. One proposed solution [4, 8] is to incorporate periodic recourse to data
owners during the data mining process, so that the data owners can perform
the data operations (on unencrypted data) that the adopted HE scheme does
not support. For example, in the context of data clustering, the comparison of
records. However, using this approach the amount of data owner participation
is significant, calling in to question the advantages that DMaaS has to offer;
although the approach does provide a suitable mechanism for collaborative se-
cure data mining [11] and therefore does have merit. There has been some work
that seeks to reduce the amount of data owner participation, of note is the idea
of a 3-D Updateable Distance Matrix (UDM) presented in [2], but this still
does not resolve the data owner participation issue. An alternative solution, in
the context of collaborative data mining, is “secret sharing” [14], which aims to
minimise data owner participation by introducing semi-honest and non-colluding
third parties that decrypt, perform operations on “data pieces” (called shares)
that hold no comprehensive information, and then re-encrypt, on behalf of the
data owner. The global results can be reconstructed by knowing the individ-
ual results from several parties. Therefore, this again does not guarantee data
confidentiality, whilst issues with data leakage remain.
From the foregoing, research directed at secure DMaaS has been predom-
inantly focused on involving data owners, or constructing complex models to
share secret keys, so as to resolve the current security issue associated with
DMaaS. As noted above, these have significant limitations. Ideally, data owners
should be able to package their data so that it is secure, send it to a third party
for storage and analysis, and receive analysis results as and when required, with-
out the need for any further communication whilst the analysis is taking place.
In this paper a mechanism is proposed whereby secure third-party data mining
(DMaaS) can be provided that does not entail any of the disadvantages of exist-
ing mechanisms. The fundamental idea, influenced in part by the UDM concept
presented in [2], is to use a 2-D Encrypted Distance Matrix (EDM). The idea is
illustrated in the context of Nearest Neighbour Clustering [3], we refer to this as
the Secure Nearest Neighbour Clustering (SNNC) approach; however, the EDM
idea clearly has wider application.
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2 Previous Work
The main challenge of HE in the context of DMaaS in general, and data cluster-
ing in particular, is that HE schemes support only a limited number of arithmetic
operations. As noted above, several theoretical and practical solutions to address
this challenge have been proposed, these can be broadly categorised as either: (i)
recourse to data owner when unsupported operations are required or (ii) utilis-
ing secret sharing techniques. Both have limitations in terms of communication
complexity and security.
The key feature of the first category of solution is the realisation of data
confidentiality by only permitting third party access to the HE data (without
knowledge of the keys that have been used for the encryption). This means that
data owner participation is required with respect to unsupported operations. The
degree of participation depends on the nature of the mining to be undertaken.
The worst case is when using what is known as Secure Multi-Party Computation
(SMPC) [4, 11, 15], where the majority of data processing is conducted in-house
by data owners. In the context of SMPC and k-Means clustering, as described
in [11, 15], the third party data miner acts as a mediator and, on each iteration,
calculates global cluster centroids; similarity measurement, assigning records to
clusters and calculating local centroids are delegated to data owners. Data owners
therefore do much of the work. In [4] k-Means clustering is also considered,
but in this case, using an appropriate HE scheme; the third party data miner
calculates distances between records and cluster centroids, and global centroids,
whilst delegating similarity determination to data owners.
There has also been work directed at reducing the data owner’s participation
where the data owner provides static and dynamic trapdoor values to guide the
third party data miner when comparing cypher-texts. One example is presented
in [8] where K-Means clustering is used to illustrate the approach. However,
data owner participation is still a significant requirement because the dynamic
trapdoors need to be recalculated on each iteration of the K-Means clustering.
The UDM concept proposed in [2] has the lowest data owner participation,
illustrated in the context of k-Means clustering, where only very limited data
owner participation is required on each iteration. However, the UDM (unlike the
proposed EDM) is unencrypted; given that a UDM is essentially a set of linear
equations this still presents a security threat. The idea of using user generated
matrices holding data to support DMaaS has featured in other contexts. For
example in [17] the data owner provides two matrices, of size (2|A| + 2) and
(2|A|+2)×|A| (where |A| is number of attributes), the two matrices are computed
using a private matrix; the process is directed at supporting data classification.
However, data owner participation is still mandatory. In [16], an improvement of
the scheme given in [17] was introduced that avoided data owner participation,
however to do this part of the secret key is disclosed which in turn threatens
data privacy.
The second category encompasses more recent work and features usage of
some form of secret sharing scheme where at least two semi-honest, non-colluding,
data miners perform computations by collaboratively decrypting private data on
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behalf of data owners, neither has access to the entire data set in unencrypted
form. For example in [12, 14] a secret key is generated, by the collaborating par-
ties, using a Threshold Paillier encryption scheme [5]. Secure computation pro-
tocols are used to allow the two parties to execute operations without requiring
data owner participation. However, the collaborative nature of the computa-
tional protocols used induce communication overheads that make secret sharing
very inefficient and thus not practical for large data sets. The requirement for
at least two semi-honest and not-colluding data miners is also of concern.
The work presented in this paper does not fit neatly in either category, it
does not require data owner participation and does not require secret sharing.
In this context the proposed EDM mechanism is unique.
3 Preliminaries
Before considering the Encrypted Distance Matrix (EDM) concept and the Se-
cure Nearest Neighbour Clustering (SNNC) approach in detail, the utilised en-
cryption schemes are presented in this section.
3.1 Homomorphic Encryption: Liu’s Scheme
Using the proposed SNNC approach, the raw data to be outsourced is encrypted
using Liu’s homomorphic encryption scheme as defined in [7]. The homomorphic
properties of the scheme support the addition and subtraction of cypher-text,
and the multiplication and division of cypher-text with real numbers. Although
the proposed SNNC does not specifically utilise the homomorphic properties of
Liu’s scheme, the proposed solution is directed at providing a generic solution
suited to many forms of secure data mining.
3.2 Order Preserving Encryption
A Distance Matrix holds the distances (differences) between each record in D
with every other record in D. Using SNNC these distances are encrypted using
an Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE) to give an Encrypted DM (EDM). Thus,
the generated EDM holds the order of distance instead of real distance values.
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Fig. 1. Message and expanded cypher space splitting
The proposed OPE scheme is an amalgamation of two existing OPE schemes;
[9] and [10]. The key feature of the OPE is to obscure any data distribution that
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Algorithm 1 Order Preserving Encryption algorithm
1: procedure Enc(x, Sens)
2: i = Interval(x)
3: [li, ri]← Range(i)
4: [l′i, r
′
i]← Range′(i)
5: Scalei =
(l′i−r′i)
(li−ri)
6: δi = Random(0, Sens× Scalei)
7: x′ = l′i + Scalei × (x− li) + δi
8: Exit with x′
might be included in the generated cypher-texts using the concept of “message
space splitting” and “non-linear cypher space expansion”. The first step is to
determine the “interval” of the message space M = [l, r) and the “interval” of
the cypher space C = [l′, r′), where r is the maximum interval boundary and l
is the minimum interval boundary, in such a way that |C|  |M |, as shown in
Figure 1. The next step is to randomly split the message space into successive
intervals, as also shown in Figure 1. The cypher space C is then split into the
same number of intervals. However, the length of the cypher space intervals
is determined by the density of the data in the corresponding message space
intervals in such a way that message space intervals that have high data densities
have large corresponding cypher space intervals. A “one-to-many” encryption
function is then adopted. With the respect to the work presented in this paper the
adopted function is shown in Algorithm 1. The encryption function commences
by retrieving the interval ID number of value x by calling the interval function
(line 2). The maximum and minimum interval boundary for the message space
interval, holding x, and the corresponding cypher space interval are retrieved in
lines 3 and 4. These values are used in lines 5 to 7 to generate the cypher x′.
The δi variable in line 6 is a random number mapped from [0, Sens × Scale)
where Sens is the minimum distance between the plain-text values in the data,
as presented in [9], and scale value as calculated in line 5. This value guarantees
that different cypher-texts, for the same plain-text value, will be generated on
different occasions thus obscuring the data frequency.
4 Encrypted Distance Matrix (EDM) Generation
Regardless of whether standard or HE encryption is used, the encryption ran-
domly translates the plain-text values in a given data set D to cypher-texts in
such a way that any value ordering that existed in the original plain-text values is
not preserved. Therefore, comparison operations cannot be directly applied and
thus even the most trivial forms of data analysis cannot be performed. The idea
presented in this paper is thus to use an Encrypted Distance Matrix (EDM),
that holds encrypted distances between data values, so that comparisons can
be conducted. An EDM is a 2D matrix where the first and second dimensions
represent the records in D. The matrix is symmetric about the leading diago-
nal, thus only the leading triangle needs to be considered. EDM generation is
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done in two steps: (i) distance calculation and (ii) encryption. Given a data set
D = {r1, r2, . . . , rn}, where each record rx is a feature vector comprised of a set
of values {vx1 , vx2 , . . . , vxa}, a distance matrix, DM(x, y), is calculated using:
DM(x, y) =
i=a∑
i=1
(vxi ∼ vyi) (1)
A DM calculated in this manner, as in the case of the UDM proposed in [2],
essentially comprises a set of linear equations which might present a security
threat. Therefore, the second step is to encrypt the data, but so that ordering is
preserved. To this end the OPE scheme given in Sub-section 3.2 above was used.
5 Secure Nearest Neighbour Clustering
This section presents the proposed Secure Nearest Neighbour Clustering (SNNC)
approach designed to operate over encrypted data and without any further user
participation once the data has been outsourced. The clustering process, like the
EDM generation process, has two steps: (i) data preparation conducted by the
data owner and (ii) consequent clustering conducted by the third party. The first
is discussed in Sub-section 5.1 below, and the second in Sub-section 5.2.
5.1 Data Owner Data Preparation
During the initial data preparation step the data owner pre-processes the data
to be outsourced by replacing the categorical (or labelled) data with discrete
integers values before any further processing. The processed data is then used to
generate the required EDM after which the data is encrypted to give D′. Once
the data has been successfully outsourced no further data owner participation
will be required (other than receiving the final clustering result).
5.2 Third Party Clustering: SNNC Algorithm
The SNNC is conducted by the third party data miner following a process similar
to that used for standard NNC [3]. The pseudo code presented in Algorithm 2
summarises this process. The input is the encrypted data set D′, the EDM
(previously submitted to the third party) and the desired threshold σ′. The
algorithm commences by assigning the first record r′1 to the first cluster K1
(lines 2 and 3). Next, the number of generated clusters so far is set to be 1 (line
4). A loop is then entered (lines 5 to 11) that iteratively clusters the remaining
records in D′. A feature of the SNNC algorithm is that the threshold value σ
is also encrypted, to give σ′, using the proposed OPE scheme so that the third
party data miner processes the order of distances not real distance values. The
record r′i will be assigned to a cluster if there exists a record r
′
m whose order of
distance from r′i is less than or equal to σ
′ using the EDM concept (lines 6 to
8). If no such record is found, a new cluster is created for r′i (lines 10 and 11).
The algorithm will continue until all records in D′ are assigned to clusters and
exits with a cluster configuration K.
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Algorithm 2 Secure Nearest Neighbour Clustering
1: procedure SecureNearestNeighbourClustering(D′, EDM,σ′)
2: K1 = {r′1}
3: K = {K1}
4: k = 1
5: for i = 2 to i = |D′| do
6: Find the r′m in some cluster in K where the EDM [r
′
i, r
′
m] is the smallest
7: if EDM [r′i, r
′
m] ≤ σ′ then
8: Km = Km ∪ r′i
9: else
10: k + +
11: Kk = {r′i}
12: Exit with K
6 Evaluation
The evaluation of the proposed SNNC approach is presented in this section.
Extensive experiments were conducted to evaluate both the SNNC approach
and the EDM concept. Fifteen data sets from the UCI data repository were
used [6], these were selected so that data sets of a variety of sizes and different
numbers of classes could be considered. The data sets are listed in Table 1. The
implementation was done using the Java programming language. The evaluation
criteria considered were: (i) data owner participation, (ii) clustering efficiency,
(iii) comparative clustering accuracy and (iv) security. Each is considered in
further detail in Sub-sections 6.1 to 6.4.
6.1 Data Owner Data Preparation Run Time Complexity
Figure 2 (a to c) shows the runtime complexity recorded to encrypt the data,
and calculate and encrypt the Distance Matrix (DM). The time to encrypt the
data is correlated to the number of data records times the number of attributes
in each data set. From the figure it can be seen that negligible time is required to
encrypt the data, the recorded time to encrypt the largest data set (Arrhythmia)
was 65ms. In the case of calculating and encrypting the DM to produce the
desired EDM, the runtimes were longer compared to data encryption although
inspection of the figure shows that it is not significantly so. The reported time
to calculate and encrypt the EDM for (Banknote authent.) was the highest;
876ms to calculate the DM and 1509ms to encrypt it. Additional records can
be added, as and when they arrive, without necessitating re-encryption of the
existing data. Once encrypted, the data and EDM are sent to the third party,
no further data owner participation is required.
6.2 Clustering Efficiency
A comparison of the runtime required to cluster the data using standard NNC
and SNNC is presented in Figure 2 (d). From the figure it can be seen that
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Fig. 2. Runtimes for data owner data preparation and NNC/SNNC execution
Table 1. Cluster Configuration Comparison using Standard NNC and SNNC.
Data Set R × C
Num.
σ
Standard NNC Secure NNC
Labels Num. Sil. Num. Sil.
Cluster Coef. Cluster Coef.
1. Iris 150× 4 4 3.00 2 0.722 2 0.722
2. Lung cancer 32×56 3 0.10 32 1.000 32 1.000
3. Arrhythmia 452×279 16 1980.00 16 0.889 16 0.889
4. Blood transfusion 748×4 2 1046.00 4 0.895 4 0.895
5. Pima Ind. Diabetes 768×8 2 498.00 2 0.741 2 0.741
6. Chronic Kidney Dis. 400×24 2 952.00 16 0.981 16 0.981
7. Seeds 210×7 3 4.00 2 0.579 2 0.579
8. Brest Cancer 699×9 2 20.00 6 0.470 6 0.470
9. Breast Tissue 106×9 6 990.00 38 0.999 38 0.999
10. Dermatology 366×34 6 26.00 8 0.745 8 0.745
11. Ecoli 336×7 8 0.76 7 0.881 7 0.881
12. Parkinsons 195×22 2 91.00 8 0.930 8 0.930
13. Ind. Liver Patient 583×10 2 100.00 98 0.997 98 0.997
14. Banknote authent. 1372×4 2 11.00 16 0.752 16 0.752
15. Libras Movement 360×90 15 10.00 19 0.753 19 0.753
the difference in execution time is minimal. It can be concluded, at least in
the context of NNC, that secure DMaaS using the proposed SNNC mechanism
does not introduce a significant efficiency overhead (once the data has been
encrypted).
6.3 Clustering Accuracy
In context of accuracy, cluster configuration “correctness” was measured by com-
paring the final clustering results obtained using standard NNC with those gen-
erated using the proposed SNNC approach; the SNNC approach should produce
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cluster configurations equivalent to those produced using standard NNC to prove
that the proposed solution is operating correctly. This was measured by the Sil-
houette Coefficients (Sil. Coef.) [13]. Table 1 gives the results obtained in the
context of both standard NNC and SNNC; columns 6 and 8. From the table
it can be seen that the clustering configurations produced using SNNC were
identical to those produced using standard NNC as evidenced by the Silhouette
Coefficients obtained using the same σ threshold (shown in column 4).
6.4 Security Analysis
Security was evaluated in terms of the potential attacks that could be directed
at the proposed secure clustering algorithm. The security of the proposed clus-
tering approach relies on the security of: (i) Liu’s scheme for encrypting the raw
data and (ii) the OPE used for encrypting the DM. Liu’s scheme is semantically
secure as proven in [8], which means that adversaries cannot determine any infor-
mation regarding the data from the cypher equivalents. In cryptography, when
a scheme is said to be semantically secure this implies that the scheme is secure
against Cypher-text Only Attacks (COAs). Therefore, with respect to the pro-
posed secure clustering, adversaries that have access to the encrypted data set
cannot readily threaten the system. In terms of the EDM, a COA could be used
to extract statistical measures describing the frequency of distribution patterns
which could be used to identify frequently occurring distributions which in turn
could be used to identify the nature of plain-texts (if examples were available).
However the nature of the OPE scheme is such that the distribution is obscured
using the concept of message space splitting and non-linear cypher space expan-
sion. The one-to-many encryption function produces different cypher-texts for
the same plain-text values thus obscuring the data frequency, especially when
the scale intervals are large. Recall that data owner participation is avoided, thus
Chosen Cypher-text attacks or Chosen Plain-texts attacks cannot be instigated
with respect to the proposed secure clustering algorithm.
7 Conclusion
In this paper a mechanism for DMaaS has been proposed founded on the idea of
an Encrypted Data Matrix (EDM). The approach was illustrated using a clus-
tering scenario, the Secure Nearest Neighbour Cluster (SNNC) approach. The
proposed method utilised Order Preserving Encryption (OPE) and Homomor-
phic Encryption (HE) to maintain data confidentiality. Unlike other proposed
solutions to third party data clustering, the proposed approach does not require
any data owner participation once the data (and the EDM) have been sent to
the third party. The reported evaluation clearly demonstrates that the encryp-
tion schemes do not adversely affect the quality of data clustering. These are
the same as when standard NNC is applied to the same data. For future work,
the authors intend to investigate the utility of the EDM concept with respect to
alternative clustering and classification algorithms.
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